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Introduction 
The word perverse has several related meanings. One is “turned away from what is 
right or good.” Another is “obstinate in opposing what is right, reasonable, or accepted.” 
And another is “arising from or indicative of stubbornness or obstinancy” (Merriam-Webster, 
2012b). To some degree, each of these definitions can be used to describe the field of 
criminology.  
Criminology is an academic discipline that I now commonly define as “the mostly 
perverted study of mostly perverted behaviors.” Starting with the latter point about mostly 
perverted behaviors, criminologists earn their livelihoods studying some of the worst 
behaviors on the planet—things like murder, rape, and other behaviors that do great harm 
to other human beings. These are behaviors that violate rules and laws (and thus are not 
right or good), that are typically not reasonable or accepted in society, and that often stem 
from one person’s stubbornness or obstinacy. 
Over the years, I’ve learned that you can only deal with these behaviors for so long 
before they start to wear on you. I remember my major professor asking me, almost two 
decades ago, why I would want to study crime for a living. He asked, “Don’t you know this 
is the worm’s eye view of the world?” My response was, “Well, what about you?” He said if 
he had to do it all over again he would have chosen a different field, perhaps the 
neurosciences (I find this quite ironic given that this particular field is one of the most 
ignored areas of study by criminologists, even though it has the potential to help us 
understand why people engage in the wide range of perverted crimes that occur every day 
in America and around the world) (e.g., see Walsh, 2008). Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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But what about the claim that criminology consists of “the mostly perverted study” of 
these behaviors? Here I mean that our studies too are typically perverse—perverse in the 
sense that most of what we do is also not right or good, and when confronted with this 
reality, we are often quite stubborn and obstinate about it. Here is an example: Every time I 
review the program of the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology (ASC), 
one of my common reactions is, “Oh look! Another test of low self-control theory!” Or 
“Someone else has tested social learning theory!” And there are literally hundreds of these 
kinds of papers every year. At this conference (and all the rest of them), we gather by the 
thousands to share with others our studies, and the great bulk of what we do has already 
been done, again and again and again, ad nauseam. This was true even in 2011, where the 
conference theme was “Breaking the Mold: Innovations and Bold Ventures in Criminology.”  
Instead of breaking the mold and being innovative and bold—instead of embracing 
necessary changes such as using inter-disciplinary approaches to more fully understand 
human behavior, integrating our existing theories to more fully explain criminality, and 
reaching out to legislators with our findings to actually influence criminal justice policy—we 
instead just continue on our current path, testing the same limited and disciplinary theories 
in mostly the same ways, completely isolated from the real-world of criminal justice policy. 
When you consider that professional criminologists get paid very generous salaries—mostly 
via tax-payer dollars—to conduct these mostly meaningless studies, this seems perverse 
indeed. 
Ask yourself these questions: Do we really need another test of low self-control 
theory or social learning theory? Don’t we already know, from thousands of previous tests, 
that crime tends to be committed by people who are impulsive and who have been 
influenced by deviant peers and bad parents? How do findings from such studies help us 
better understand criminal behavior? How do they help us more successfully influence Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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criminal justice policy? How do they help us bring about crime prevention programs based 
on all we already know? 
The simple answer is that they don’t. And yet, we continue stubbornly and 
obstinately on the same path, year after year, writing and publishing papers about the same 
topics in the same way, papers that will never be read by the vast majority of people on the 
planet. In reading Robert Agnew’s Toward a Unified Criminology, I get the sense that he 
would agree with much of this assessment of our field for he convincingly argues that the 
discipline of criminology is fragmented, stuck in the past, and ineffective. Agnew, known 
mostly for his own classic theory in the field—general strain theory—clearly lays out the 
problems with our discipline and offers a way forward to overcoming them.  
Agnew’s Main Argument 
Agnew’s main argument pertains to criminological theory, that part of criminology 
that aims to explain human behavior generally and especially criminal behavior. Scores of 
theories have been developed within the field, a multi-disciplinary academic discipline 
influenced by sociology, psychology, anthropology, economics, biology, and other fields of 
study. Agnew claims that each and every one of these theories is supported by some 
evidence and that each is thus partially true. In spite of this, criminology remains divided 
because of its disagreements about which theories are (most) true and which are (most) 
false. Agnew claims that the “division has hurt the field and the larger society” by making it 
impossible to provide a full understanding of the etiology of criminal behavior and to 
suggest logical and effective crime prevention implications to policy-makers (p. 5).  
According to Agnew, the divisions begin with the assumptions that underlie our 
theories, assumptions that deal with: 1) a basic definition of crime (e.g., what behaviors 
should be subjected to study in the first place?); 2) whether or not human behavior is 
determined by factors beyond our control (i.e., determinism) or the result of our own Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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choices (referred to by Agnew as “agency”); 3) whether fundamental human nature is such 
that we act out of self-interest, concern for others, or as a result of all that is written on our 
“blank slates” through environmental experiences; 4) the nature of society (i.e., is it 
characterized by consensus or conflict?); and 5) the nature of reality (i.e., can objective 
reality even be experienced or is everything constructed by humans and thus subjective in 
nature?). Agnew devotes a chapter of Toward a Unified Criminology to arguments that 
revolve around each of these assumptions and ultimately reaches the same conclusion: 
there is evidence in support of all sides of each argument. 
Agnew’s review of a voluminous amount of research shows that each of the 
supposedly conflicting assumptions underlying our criminological theories enjoys some 
degree of empirical support. For example, Agnew concludes that most people do agree on 
what kinds of behaviors should be considered crimes and especially serious crimes (as 
suggested by mainstream criminologists), but that critical criminologist have a valid point 
when they assert that the most dangerous acts are generally not illegal and thus largely 
ignored by criminologists (p. 14). An example discussed by Agnew is deviant acts by 
corporations (p. 109). His integrated definition of crime would allow criminologists to study 
any blameworthy harm that either is condemned by the public or sanctioned by the state 
(p. 37). 
Research also shows that that human behavior is influenced by factors beyond our 
control (as suggested by deterministic or positivistic criminologists) but that people also 
have some choice over how they behave (as suggested by rational choice theorists), 
especially when it comes to deliberate behaviors such as crimes. His conclusion is that 
humans possess “bounded agency,” meaning they can and do exercise some control over 
their behaviors within limitations created by environmental experiences, some of which we 
are not even aware (p. 52). And he shows that agency or choice is more common when 
individuals are motivated to change their behavior, when they believe they actually can Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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change their behavior, when they have the resources to make change, and when they live 
in environments that are not conducive to crime (p. 70). 
The logic on which such assertions rest is on interaction rather than causality. This 
means that criminal behavior is not caused by factors beyond our control or even caused by 
the exercise of free will (i.e., agency) but instead is made more likely in certain situations 
and contexts. This is the argument I too made in my integrated systems theory of antisocial 
behavior (Robinson, 2004). The goal of that work was to identify and discuss the numerous 
factors that put people at risk for antisocial and criminal behaviors and to show how they 
interact to increase the likelihood or probability of these behaviors. Such an inter-
disciplinary approach actually draws the risk factors out from all major criminological 
theories and in essence leaves the theories and theorists themselves behind in favor of 
identifying those things that make crime more likely to occur so that it can be prevented 
(Robinson & Beaver, 2009).  
Such an approach is no small undertaking since “criminologists are selective in their 
focus, considering certain potential causes but ignoring others … based on the academic 
disciplines in which criminologists were trained” (p. 73). Agnew shows that one criminologist 
might ignore a field of study entirely just because he or she was not educated in it. This 
point is ironic given that it comes from a scholar whose work itself has illustrated the 
drawbacks of what I have called disciplinary myopia—not being able to see outside of one’s 
own academic discipline. Agnew is most well-known for extending strain theory beyond just 
financial strains (Merton, 1938) to include other sources of strain, including losing 
something of value, having opportunities blocked, and experiencing any noxious or negative 
stimuli (Agnew, 2001). Agnew’s general strain theory essentially boils down to the idea that 
frustrations of all kind can produce aggression, a hypothesis long posited by psychologists. 
Yet, it took the discipline of criminology 50 years to evolve strain theory beyond financial 
strains to other sources of frustration. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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Today, general strain theory is enormously popular, producing dozens of tests every 
year (Agnew, 2006). Scholars tweak the theory and try to extend it, even as Agnew himself 
has moved away from it toward a more general and integrated theory of crime (Agnew, 
2005). So, the founder of general strain theory has demonstrated that the sources of 
criminal behavior are far more complex than those found in the theory, yet criminologists 
continue to more heavily focus on general strain theory as opposed to Agnew’s general 
theory (or the numerous other integrated theories recently developed in the field) 
(Farrington, 2008). 
Part of this is owed to the fact that most criminologists have not been trained in 
academic disciplines such as biology, genetics, neurology, and so forth, and instead follow 
the “taken-for-granted” approach where sociological and psychological theories of crime and 
their assumptions are internalized by new students through socialization by mentors and 
other scholars (p. 8). Agnew himself has broadened his theoretical approach to integrate 
some of these academic disciplines into a more complex theory of criminal behavior, and he 
again addresses the issue in this book. 
To this point, most criminologists are obstinate and stubborn. They refuse to learn 
even the basics of genetic and neurological sciences, which makes it impossible for them to 
extend the ability of their mostly social-psychological theories of crime to more fully explain 
criminal behavior. As Agnew asserts, criminological theory today only has modest 
explanatory power. 
It should be pointed out that Agnew’s use of the term cause in the text is perplexing. 
Throughout the book, he argues that sources of behavior are numerous and complex, and 
that they interact with each other to impact behavior. Yet, he then he lays out what he calls 
the individual-level causes and macro-level causes of criminal behavior (pp. 160-161). A 
cause is “a reason for an action or condition” (Merriam-Webster, 2012a). It is more than Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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mere correlation as a cause requires a meaningful relationship, time-order sequencing, and 
a lack of spuriousness (Robinson, 2004). The argument Agnew makes is essentially anti-
causal, suggesting instead that human behavior is driven by a wide variety of different 
factors that interact to make it more or less likely depending on the circumstances.  
He even writes: “Most causes generally increase the likelihood of crime, but the 
causes do not always lead to crime” (p. 163). The example he provides deals with 
experiences with material deprivation (i.e., strain). Agnew lists crime as but one of six 
possible responses to strain, and thus other contingencies help determine whether strain 
leads to crime. This is not a true cause and effect relationship and thus the term cause is 
not appropriate. At the end of the book, Agnew shows he agrees, writing that, although 
most criminologists assume that factors have “linear, additive, and lagged effects on crime” 
in fact “there is sometimes good reason to assume that some effects are nonlinear, 
interactive, and/or contemporaneous” (p. 200). 
This may seem like a small matter, but I’ve argued elsewhere that one of the major 
problems with criminological theory is the assumption that criminal behavior is caused by 
anything when in fact all the available evidence we have suggests human behavior is far too 
complex to be considered the result of causal influences ; instead, certain kinds of behaviors 
are made more or less likely based on scores of factors coming together and interacting in 
various environments (Robinson, 1998). Talk about an assumption that criminologists have 
wrong! 
In Toward a Unified Criminology, Agnew also addresses another issue about which 
criminologists are obstinate and stubborn—the issue of basic human nature. All of us have 
encountered criminologists who believe wholeheartedly in social learning theories. Such 
theories assume that children are born good and must learn to be bad through interactions 
in close groups setting with friends and families (Akers, 2009). And all of us know Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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criminologists who fully believe in the opposite view of human nature—posited by social 
control theories—which suggests that children are born bad and must learn to be good 
through interactions in close groups setting with friends and families (Goode, 2008). There 
are criminologists who refuse to even consider the possibility that theories with such 
opposite assumptions about human nature can be integrated (Hirschi, 1989).  
In my criminological theory classes, students examine the assumptions of social 
learning and social control theories and usually come to the immediate realization that both 
sets of theories are really saying the same thing—that human behavior is learned. 
Specifically, social learning theories suggest that bad behavior is learned, and social control 
theorists suggest that good behavior is learned. Since the theories do not make opposite 
assertions, it ought to be possible to integrate them.  
On the issue of whether children are born good or born bad, Agnew suggests the 
answer is both. He shows that, at birth, children are self-interested (an extreme and “bad” 
type of self-interest is selfishness) but simultaneously they are also socially concerned (an 
example is empathy, which is found even in infants) (p. 100). Agnew shares evidence 
demonstrating that humans across the life course are at times self-interested but also often 
socially concerned, and “partly blank slates” (because environmental experience does 
impact us). Here, the evidence shows that yes, people do often strive to pursue their own 
interests (as suggested by theories such as rational choice, low self-control, and social 
control), but they also have a strong tendency to act in response to pressures that result 
from being concerned with others in society (as suggested by strain theories). Finally, 
people are also obviously impacted by their social experiences (as suggested by social 
learning theories). 
While it is admirable that Agnew gives credence to each of these approaches and 
shows that they are really not incompatible, I think he is mistaken to conclude that “there is Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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much evidence for the assumption that people are blank slates” (p. 85). The idea that, at 
birth, humans are like a blackboard on which nothing is written and thus what people 
become is entirely based on what is written on them (i.e., learning from experience), is 
false. Yes, it is true that experience matters greatly, as Agnew shows repeatedly through 
the text, but experience does not determine outcomes such as criminal behavior in isolation 
from other factors. Further, people are born with writing already present on their slates, 
meaning people are born with certain propensities including the propensity for aggressive 
and violent behaviors (Rafter, 2008). 
Agnew himself acknowledges this, both in his general theory as well as in Toward a 
Unified Criminology, when he discusses the influence of genes and brain function on 
behavior. For example, he writes: “Studies suggest that genetic inheritance plays a 
substantial role in explaining variation in … traits [such as empathy, conformity, and self-
interest], as well as in the major dimensions of personality more generally” (p. 105). We 
are born with our genes and thus we are not born as a blank slate. True, genes only impact 
behavior as they interact with environmental factors, and the impressive human brain—so 
capable of growth and change—also play a large role in whether behavior is prosocial or 
antisocial, as Agnew himself points out (p. 106). So, Agnew seems to contradict himself by 
concluding there is evidence that humans are born as blank slates even as he provides 
evidence that we are not. 
Agnew even addresses the issue of temperament, defined in the book as “individual 
differences that appear from birth onward, remain relatively stable across the lifespan, and 
presumably have a strong genetic or neurological basis” (De Pauw, Mervielde, & Leeuwen, 
2009) (p. 100). Yet, he misses the opportunity to utilize personal experience to show how 
temperament is proof that we are not born as blank slates. For example, I have raised two 
children of my own, and both were vastly different from birth. One was a more difficult baby 
but grew into a child who loved to read and speak from a very early age. The other was a Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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much easier baby but grew into a child who was not as interested in reading and speaking 
until much later. Both were raised in very similar environments in nearly identical ways 
(e.g., both were read to in the womb and every night as babies and toddlers), yet they 
remain quite different. These two children were born different.  
Yet, Agnew’s conclusion is sound. Learning plays a large role in human behavior, 
including criminal behavior, and thus Agnew stresses that this reality must be included in 
any effort to integrate criminological theory and unify criminology. As one example, Agnew 
asserts that “the general inclinations for social concern and self-interest are specified and 
modified through social learning” (p. 112), which is to say that experience helps us to know 
in what situations and contexts it is most appropriate to be socially concerned and/or self-
interested.   
    The last two sets of supposedly conflicting assumptions are, to me, the least 
important ones addressed in the book. On the first issue, Agnew concludes that American 
society is characterized by both consensus and conflict, and that important decisions of 
policy-makers are made in the process of an intense competition where the powerful usually 
win (p. 138). Anyone who has an hour to spare can examine basic literature from academic 
disciplines of legal studies to see that this is fair conclusion. 
  On the second issue on the nature of reality (whether reality can even be 
experienced), Agnew concludes that reality exists and can be experienced, but that it often 
is interpreted differently by different people, meaning that perceived reality often matters 
as much if not more than actual reality (p. 186). I question including this discussion at the 
end of the book because, throughout the book, Agnew has relied on studies of objective 
reality to reach conclusions regarding each of the other assumptions of criminological 
theory. That is, were Agnew to conclude that objective reality does not exist, it would have 
been odd for him to then conclude that it does not exist. I also don’t think the whole Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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discussion adds much to the book anyway, other than the point that “behavior is influenced 
by both subjective views and objective reality. Individuals base their actions on their views, 
even if such views are mistaken. But at the same time, the real world imposes constraints 
on action and influences individuals in ways that they are unaware of or misperceive” (p. 
186). 
Agnew’s Conclusion 
  Agnew concludes: “In brief, we live in a complex and variable world. The 
assumptions that underlie particular crime theories and perspectives are overly simplistic, 
each reflecting only a part of this world. As a result, each theory or perspective typically has 
some support, but falls far short of providing a complete explanation of crime.” Agnew 
attributes this in part to “the very different assumptions” of each approach that “make[] it 
impossible to integrate them—so that criminologists might better explain crime and 
advocate for its control” (p. 194). 
  For me, Agnew’ book satisfactorily settles the argument that the perceived 
differences in assumptions are not as real or as significant as imagined and argued by 
criminologists housed in different theoretical camps. Thus, that which needs to be done to 
create interdisciplinary and integrated theories that fully account for criminal behavior can 
now be done. The main barrier to this work, in my estimation, is what makes criminology so 
perverse—the stubbornness and obstinance of most mainstream criminologists to embrace 
those necessary changes laid out in this essay. Hopefully this book will be widely read and 
embraced by (especially young and new) criminologists so that a unified criminology will 
soon come to exist.   Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
July, 2012, Vol. 4(2):27-39    M. Robinson 
38 
 
References 
Agnew, R. (2001). Building on the foundation of general strain theory: Specifying the types 
of   strain most likely to lead to crime and delinquency. Journal of Research in Crime and 
  Delinquency, 38¸319-361. 
Agnew, R. (2005). Why Do Criminals Offend? A General Theory of Crime and Delinquency. 
  New York: Oxford University Press. 
Akers, R. (2009). Social Learning and Social Structure: A General Theory of Crime and 
  Deviance. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction. 
De Pauw, S., Mervielde, & Leeuwen, K. (2009). How are traits related to problem behavior 
in   preschoolers? Similarities and contrasts between temperament and personality. 
Journal of   Abnormal Child Psychology, 37, 309-325. 
Farrington, D. (2008). Integrated Development and Life-Course Theories of Offending. 
  Piscataway, NJ: Transaction. 
Goode, E. (2008). Out of Control: Assessing the General Theory of Crime. Stanford, CA: 
  Stanford University Press. 
Hirschi, T. (1989). Exploring alternatives to integrated theory. In Messner, S., Krohn, M., &  
Liska, A. (Eds.), Theoretical Integration in the Study of Deviance and Crime: 
Problems and Prospects (pp. 37-50). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Merriam-Webster (2012). Entry for cause. Retrieved July 9, 2012 from:  
  http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cause 
Merriam-Webster (2012). Entry for perverse. Retrieved July 9, 2012 from:  
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/perverse 
Rafter, N. (2008). The Criminal Brain: Understanding Biological Theories of Crime. New  
  York: New York University Press. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
July, 2012, Vol. 4(2):27-39    M. Robinson 
39 
 
Robinson, M. (1998). Teaching Criminological Theory Through An Integrated Systems  
Perspective. Paper presented to the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal 
Justice Sciences annual meeting, March. 
Robinson, M. (2004). Why Crime? An Integrated Systems Theory of Antisocial Behavior.  
  Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Robinson, M. & Beaver, K. (2009). Why Crime? An Interdisciplinary Approach to Explaining  
  Criminal Behavior. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.  
Walsh, A. (2008). Biosocial Criminology: New Directions in Theory and Research. New York:  
  Routledge. 
 